Abstract -Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) are growing in popularity because of their inherent robustness, versatility, and ease of deployment in situations such as natural or man-made disasters. Another area of potential use for these networks is in physical security systems where they can potentially improve mobile communications, communications with remote locations, temporary communications, and geolocation applications. Since these physical security systems may employ a mobile WMN to transport sensitive or classified information, questions arise as to whether end-to-end encryption would work within a very dynamic WMN. We could not find published data or results concerning this. Therefore, we set out to find whether end-to-end encryption will continue to work through an ever-changing WMN. We examined the behavior of endto-end encryption when the path through the wireless network changes (that is, when routing is forced through a different intermediate node or nodes) and when traversing a radio frequency (RF) shadow. We especially wished to determine whether a tunnel, as used in software virtual private networks (VPNs) or hardware encryption devices, would survive RF shadow transits and mesh network topology changes. This paper presents an introduction to WMNs, their applicability to physical security systems, our end-to-end encryption experiments, analysis of the results, and our conclusions.
Following the nomenclature of the paper by Akyildiz and Wang on wireless mesh networks [1] , WMNs fall into one of three categories based upon their architecture.
One kind of WMN is a client wireless mesh network. These WMNs have peer-to-peer meshing among client devices and no wireless infrastructure. These are the same as conventional ad hoc wireless networks, where any client can communicate with any partner within range. Client WMNs may employ more sophisticated routing and configuration algorithms than conventional ad hoc networks.
Another kind of WMN is the infrastructure or backbone wireless mesh network. This type of WMN meshes at the infrastructure level, i.e. a wireless meshing backbone is formed between wireless infrastructure devices (access points, mesh wireless routers, etc.). Some or all of these infrastructure devices have a connection to the wired network. Others may serve as a combination access point and repeater. If an infrastructure node loses its wired connection, it may turn into a repeating access point, maintaining continuity with other pieces of wireless infrastructure, which may have a connection to the wired network. Clients do not mesh.
Hybrid wireless mesh networks are the third kind of WMN. They are a combination of infrastructure meshing and client meshing. In these fully meshed networks, wireless clients can interact with and through other clients, and with infrastructure nodes, which in turn interact with and through other infrastructure nodes as they pass data to and from the wired network. For this paper our interest is in the hybrid/fully meshed wireless network, although the experimental results are also applicable to client WMNs.
We set out to find whether end-to-end encryption will continue to work through an ever-changing WMN. We wanted to examine the behavior of end-to-end encryption when the path through the wireless network changes (for example, when routing is forced through a different intermediate node) or when traversing a radio frequency (RF) shadow, (that is, when passing through an area where the RF coverage is being blocked by some obstruction). We especially wished to determine whether a tunnel, as used in software virtual private networks (VPNs) or hardware encryption devices, would survive RF shadow transits and mesh network topology changes.
In the following sections of this paper, we describe the rational for this research, our experiments, our analysis of the results, and our conclusions.
RESEARCH RATIONAL
On one of our projects needing a highly mobile wireless mesh network, questions arose concerning whether end-toend encryption would work within the WMN. Although numerous people felt it SHOULD work, nobody we spoke with knew for certain that it would work, due to the dynamic nature of WMNs. We could not find published data or results that we felt would apply to our situation.
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) co-sponsored and participated in Trident Warrior '08, which is a multi-national communications exercise held at sea [2] [5] [7] . Among other experiments and tests, they were involved with wireless mesh networking [5] [7] . Although they had success with their experiments using a meshing backbone, it is the opinion of this paper's authors that the topology of a flotilla does not usually change rapidly enough for network reconfiguration to cause problems. If an encryption tunnel is dropped and needs to get reestablished, much traffic can be passed through the new tunnel before a network reconfiguration event might cause another dropped tunnel.
Our goal in this research was to examine the end-to-end encryption performance in a broadband wireless mesh network that suffered network topology reconfigurations spaced on the order of seconds, rather than minutes or hours.
We feel this would be representative of the conditions found in a vehicular or pedestrian-mobile mesh network.
Specifically, there were four questions we wanted to answer. We constructed several experiments so we could answer these questions.
EXPERIMENTS
For our experiments we used a wireless mesh network built upon the Motorola Mesh Enabled Architecture TM (MEA TM ) technology. (Although we used no infrastructure nodes in our experiments, the MEA laptop computer interface cards, RF modems for vehicles, and infrastructure nodes from Motorola are all based on the same transceiver module, and for the purposes of these experiments, could be interchanged.) We used the Iperf utility program with Jperf (a graphical front end for easy configuration) for all traffic generation and throughput rate measurements in these experiments.
Modern encryptors, which are NSA certified to process classified data, are termed Type 1.
These Type 1 encryptors include the TACLANE ® family manufactured by General Dynamics, the RedEagle TM family manufactured by L3 Communications, and the AltaSec ® family manufactured by ViaSat. All of these encryptors are HAIPE ® compliant. HAIPE is a National Security Agency (NSA) specification, which defines encryptor interoperability. HAIPE is based upon IPSec.
IPSec allows an encrypted tunnel to be created between two private networks. It also allows for authenticating both ends of the tunnel. IPSec only supports IP traffic. If non-IP based traffic needs to be transported, it must be done in conjunction with another protocol, such as Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE). IPSec is a very popular method of creating VPNs.
IPSec uses three protocols to form a security framework. They are:
• IKE (Internet Key Exchange), which provides a framework for negotiating security parameters and establishing authenticated keys. The details of IKE are covered in RFC 2409.
• ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload), which provides a framework for encrypting, authenticating, and securing data. The details of ESP are in RFC 2406.
• AH (Authentication Header), which provides a framework for authenticating and securing data. The data header and payload are both checked, unlike ESP which only checks the data. The details of AH are in RFC 2402.
In the case of encryption hardware, IPSec allows an encrypted tunnel to be created between two Type 1 hardware encryptors. HAIPE uses both the IKE and ESP protocols.
Since we did not have Type 1 encryption hardware available for testing, we used a software solution. For an IPSec VPN, we used the Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) capability supplied with Microsoft Windows XP, and preplaced certificates.
The first experiment was conducted in the lab to acquire baseline data. We wired two laptop nodes together using an Ethernet crossover cable. We passed traffic over the wired link using Iperf/Jperf to obtain the throughput rate, unencumbered by an IPSec VPN tunnel. Next, we established a software IPSec VPN tunnel between the two laptops and observed how long it took to establish the tunnel. We then passed IP traffic through the VPN over the wired link and recorded the throughput rate.
Next in the laboratory, we repeated the above procedures substituting an RF link using Motorola MEA equipment, for the Ethernet crossover cable.
Again we collected throughput data with and without the IPSec VPN, over the MEA RF link. We also observed the length of time it took to establish the VPN tunnel over the MEA RF link.
Our second experiment was conducted in the field and permitted us to gather data on the behavior of the IPSec VPN with an RF shadow. We placed two laptops on opposite sides of a building with sufficient metal doors and panels to block the RF signal. Once we saw where we had to position the laptops for complete RF signal loss, we moved the laptops into a line-of-sight position beyond the corners of the building (Figure 1) . In this position, we passed traffic over the MEA link and recorded the data rate.
We established an IPSec VPN tunnel between the two laptops and observed how long tunnel establishment took. We then passed traffic through the IPSec VPN tunnel over the MEA link and recorded the data rate. Next, while still passing traffic, we moved into the RF shadow cast by the building (Figure 2) . After approximately 14 seconds of all packets being dropped (the data rate at zero), we moved back out of the RF shadow of the building and observed the VPN tunnel behavior and the data throughput.
Our third experiment was also conducted in the field and involved forcing a change in the wireless mesh network topology, such as would be seen as nodes move around in a wireless mesh network. We first placed two laptops on opposite sides of the building, such that the RF signal was blocked. We moved an intermediate wireless mesh node into position to act as a relay between the two laptops and passed traffic over the ensuing MEA link, recording the throughput rate (Figure 3) . Next we established an IPSec VPN tunnel between the two laptops, through the intermediate node and observed the tunnel establishment time. We then passed traffic through the IPSec VPN tunnel over the MEA link (that is now a twohop link) and recorded the throughput rate. While passing traffic, we activated a second intermediate relay node (in the vicinity of the first relay node) and waited for it to boot up and become fully active in the mesh network. At that point, we shut off the first intermediate node and observed the re-routing through the second (now active) intermediate node ( Figure 4) . We observed the VPN tunnel behavior and recorded the data throughput rate. This simulated a link in our data path being handed off to another node due to a location change (possibly resulting in a poor signal strength level on the original link) by an intermediate node. Lastly, while still passing traffic, we repeated the steps to reactivate the first intermediate node and shut down the second. This forced another change in the mesh network routing. Again, we observed behavior and recorded the data throughput rate.
RESULTS AND FINDINGS
On our baseline experiments in the lab, the throughput rates we observed over the wired Ethernet link, unencumbered by the VPN, were between 297 Mbps and 335 Mbps. Using the IPSec VPN without software compression, we saw a throughput of about 49.9 Mbps.
Using software compression with the IPSec VPN, we observed a data rate of about 113 Mbps.
For the RF test in the lab, without the VPN, we saw throughput of approximately 1.15 Mbps.
When we established the IPSec VPN over the MEA link (on the lab bench), we observed throughputs of 537 Kbps and 2.03 Mbps respectively, with the software compression disabled and enabled.
Over the wired Ethernet connection in the lab, the data throughput rate was so high that even though the software data compression improved the throughput, it could not overcome the encryption overhead imposed by the IPSec VPN tunnel. In the case of the RF MEA link in the lab, which had a lower throughput rate and therefore less data to encrypt, the software compression more than made up for the overhead caused by the encryption of the IPSec VPN tunnel, and actually produced a higher data rate. All the experiments conducted in the field had the software compression enabled for the VPN tunnel.
In the field experiment involving traversing an RF shadow, the MEA link throughput was about 1.38 Mbps. Using the IPSec VPN we observed a data rate of about 2.43 Mbps before we moved into the RF shadow of the building, and about 2.19 Mbps after we came out of the RF shadow. This 10% reduction in the data throughput rate could be attributed to not returning the laptops to precisely the original position when emerging from the RF shadow of the building, or numerous other factors. Again the software compression of the VPN more than fully compensated for the performance loss from the encryption of the VPN.
In our last field experiment, changing the wireless mesh network topology while passing data traffic, we observed a data throughput rate of approximately 533 Kbps. This is about what we would expect to see over a two hop MEA link.
When using the IPSec VPN with software compression, we saw a data throughput rate of about 1.26 Mbps, which again is about what we would expect to see over a two hop MEA link given the performance boost of the software compression in mitigating the performance loss caused by the encryption overhead. There was no noticeable discontinuity when the network was forced to route packets through the alternate intermediate wireless node and a throughput of approximately 1.40 Mbps was observed. (This somewhat higher throughput rate may be caused by the placement of the alternate intermediate wireless node.) When the network topology was forced back into its original configuration, we again observed a throughput of about 1.26 Mbps with no noticeable discontinuity at the time of cutover.
VPN tunnel establishment times did not vary much. In the lab, over the wired Ethernet connection, the time to establish the VPN tunnel was a second or less. Using the RF MEA link, the time it took to establish the VPN was about 2-3 seconds, whether in the lab or out in the field.
SUMMARY
We were able to gain information to resolve all four questions we wanted answered.
We found that the IPSec VPN tunnel persists through short link outages, like those characteristic of RF shadow transits. When we emerged from the RF shadow of the building, the VPN did not need to be re-established and we resumed passing data traffic at substantially the same data throughput rate.
When the topology of the active portion of the wireless mesh network (i.e. the nodes of the network used by our active end-to-end link) changed, the IPSec VPN tunnel was unaffected. The VPN tunnel did not drop or need to be reestablished when the communication path changed to route through a different wireless mesh node.
The data throughput rate was substantially identical on both paths through the wireless mesh network.
The IPSec VPN tunnel took somewhat longer to establish over the RF link than over the wired link, but not by an unreasonable amount (2-3 seconds vs. about 1 second or less). The time needed to establish an IPSec VPN tunnel over the RF MEA link did not seem to vary much between a short one hop link in the lab, a one hop link in the field, and a two hop link in the field. It seems that as long as you have several hundred thousand bits per second of bandwidth (and maybe less) at your disposal, you can perform the necessary protocol exchanges to establish the IPSec VPN tunnel in a reasonable amount of time. At some point, above the megabit per second bandwidth rate, the tunnel establishment time shrinks, but bandwidth does not seem to be the constraint here, as linear increases in available bandwidth yield less than linear decreases in tunnel establishment times.
The software encryption of an IPSec VPN tunnel imposes a performance penalty, the amount of which depends upon the end node processor speed.
In high bandwidth situations -such as wired Ethernet links -the data transmission rates are great enough that even with the gains obtained using software compression over the VPN tunnels, there is still a decrease in throughput performance caused by the software encryption of an IPSec VPN tunnel. With lower data transmission rates and fast end nodessuch as in our experiments using the Motorola MEA technology -the compression offered by the IPSec VPN software can overcome the overhead added by the encryption.
Because HAIPE compliant Type 1 encryptors are based upon IPSec, we would expect some of the results of our software-based experiments, including continuity in our RF shadow and changing network topology, to carry over to hardware encryptors that incorporate IPSec. We would expect that vehicles equipped with an IPSec-based, HAIPE compliant, hardware encryptor installed between a computer and an RF modem (such as those made by Motorola, employing the MEA technology) could traverse an RF shadow without dropping, and needing to re-establish, the encryption tunnel. A parameter relating to tunnels and "keep alive" signals (if the hardware encryptor is so equipped) may have to be adjusted for acceptable performance in this area. Furthermore, we would expect such vehicles containing IPSec-based, HAIPE compliant, hardware encryptors to operate seamlessly in a mesh network, without having to re-establish encryption tunnels or security associations as the wireless mesh network topology changes and end-to-end routes traverse different intermediate nodes.
Moreover, in a wireless mesh network employing Type 1 encryption hardware and no data compression, the throughput performance penalty should be largely eliminated. Most Type 1 hardware encryptors operate at line rates, with low latency.
CONCLUSION
These experiments show that encryption based upon IPSec, can function properly in mobile wireless mesh networks, despite the challenges of RF shadow transits and shifting paths through an ever-changing mesh network. This indicates that WMNs with end-to-end encryption in IPSec tunnels can support physical security system applications. Future work could include replacing the software VPN with Type 1 hardware encryptors and measuring any changes in performance. 
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